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This paper makes a unique contribution to the HRM convergence-divergence debate by 
examining whether organizations operating in Europe, over the 10-year time period preceding 
2000, are converging in their adoption of contingent employment practice. The susceptibility 
of contingent employment practice to both convergent and divergent pressures acts as a useful 
analytical lens. Data are drawn from organizations operating in Germany, Spain, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the UK in 1991 (2918 organizations), 1995 (2048 organizations) and 2000 
(1555 organizations).The results suggest that convergence is limited by the institutional 
embeddedness of organizations.  
 
Keywords: Convergence/divergence, institutional context, comparative HRM, 
contingent employment 
                                                 
1   The authors are grateful to the editor and three anonymous reviewers for their positive and helpful comments on an earlier 





CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE: THE EXAMPLE OF CONTINGENT 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
 
The incidence of homogeneity and heterogeneity in management practice across national 
borders stokes the convergence-divergence debate. The tensions between the two forces are 
heightened in comparative Human Resource Management (HRM) because of the relationship 
between HRM and the institutional context (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Brewster, 1995; 
Adler, 1997; Whitley, 2000a; Hall and Soskice, 2001), with research in Europe demonstrating 
the importance of national institutional structures on HRM practice (see for example Poole, 
1986; Due et al., 1991; Visser, 1992; Bean and Holden, 1992; Hyman and Ferner, 1994; 
Gooderham et al.,, 1999). Further developments in this field need to address some of the 
current empirical limitations and conceptual ambiguity.  
First, much of the work to-date focuses on static similarities and differences providing 
only a partial analysis of the situation (Craig and Douglas, 1992). An examination of trends 
over time is needed to provide more comprehensive empirical insights into the dynamic 
processes of convergence or divergence.  
Second, the meaning of the terms convergence and divergence have been confounded, 
partly due to the complexities of conducting comparative research and the methodological 
dilemmas this creates (Adler, 1984; Von Glinow, 2003). There is a need for greater nuancing 
of the terms. As a contribution to this Mayrhofer et al (2004) and Mayrhofer and Brewster 
(2005) have suggested using the terms “directional convergence” for similarity in trends and 
“final convergence” for increasing similarity of practice. In the latter case, because initial 
practices are dissimilar, trends may or may not be in the same direction but indicate 
increasing similarity in meaning. This theoretical development is valuable in analytical terms 





defines with greater clarity the substance of observed similarities and differences in practices. 
In terms of theoretical prediction and explanation of observed practices, this greater nuancing 
of the term convergence encourages greater precision in the identification of institutional 
sources of influence and their impact.  
Third, many of the theoretical debates on convergence are embedded within American 
dominated theoretical developments and empirical evidence (Guest, 1990; Brewster, 1995, 
1999). However, the economic and regulatory drivers of convergence evidenced in the US 
have a potentially different impact in, for example, Europe. Smith and Meiksins (1995) argue 
that there is an accepted hierarchy between economies and as a result the „society-in-
dominance‟ acts as a benchmark or standard of good practice from which other countries 
attempt to borrow. The economic dominance of the U.S.A. has led to the diffusion of theory 
and organizational practice from the U.S.  However, Smith and Meiksins further argue that 
competition between dominant countries, such as the U.S. or Japan, (or in the European 
context between the German or Swedish models of work organization), means that no single 
model persists. Equally, countries strive to use the uniqueness in their cultural and 
institutional frameworks to create distinct national competitive advantage (Porter, 1990), 
potentially mitigating against the diffusion of „best practice‟ models with implications for 
both theory and HRM best practice models (Weinstein and Kochan, 1995; Whitley, 2000b; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
To explore these issues we use contingent employment practices as our subject and 
Europe as our example. We focus on contingent employment practice to be consistent with 
suggestions that the regulatory, normative and cognitive elements of the institutional context 
and their impact is issue specific (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Kostova and Roth, 2002). 





both from the national context and the regional context through the European Union: what 
Kostova and Roth (2002: 216) called „institutional duality‟.  
The paper adopts the following format: we explore the rationale for focusing on 
contingent employment practices and five European countries with extensive, but distinctive, 
uses of contingent employment before reviewing briefly the convergence/divergence debate 
(focusing on the differences between the convergent pressures of institutional theory and the 
divergent pressures of institutional contextual difference). We then apply that to the issue of 
contingent working practices in order to develop three hypotheses. These are then tested using 
data from Europe and the findings and results are discussed. 
 
CONTINGENT EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND THE EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT 
There are many definitions of contingent employment on offer: we follow Polivk and 
Nardone, (1989:10) who define „contingent‟ employment in broad terms as “any arrangement 
that differs from full-time, permanent, wage and salary employment”. This paper focuses on 
three specific aspects: namely part-time contracts, temporary contracts and fixed-term 
contracts.  
Contingent employment practices reflect different approaches to enhancing 
organizational flexibility, namely, the ability to adapt without undue pain or cost to the 
requirements of the market, which is seen as critical to the competitive success of firms. As 
such we might expect innovations to be copied by others, or for such innovations to be 
replicated within the same or similar institutional contexts (Daniels et al., 2001).  
Europe provides a fascinating context for examining the adoption of organizational 
practice because of the duality of its institutional context. The attempts in Europe to create a 





different models of human resource management (Brewster, 1995; Sparrow, Schuler and 
Jackson, 1994). The five countries included in this study (Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and UK) are members of the European Union and as such are subject to the 
convergent policy pressures from the European market and the European Commission. For 
example, the European Community Social Charter introduced in 1989 and its associated 
Social Action Program aimed to establish at least a convergence of legal minimum 
requirements for contingent working. These were controversial and it was not until 1999 that 
the Part-time and Fixed-term directives were agreed (Schömann et al, 1998), with a 
requirement for European legislation to be incorporated at the national level by the year 2000. 
This legislation gives equal employment protection to part-time and fixed-term workers as is 
afforded permanent workers (CEC, 1999). Despite convergence pressures at the European 
level there is resistance at the national level which can be explained, in part, through the 
variation in employment protection and skill development systems.  
 
Employment protection and skill development in Europe 
Employment protection and skill development regimes are key dimensions to consider 
when examining contingent employment practices for two reasons. Firstly, where 
employment protection is high this can create rigidities in the labor market system that can 
hinder organizational flexibility. Second, labor market skill systems have an important impact 
on the extent to which the workforce has skills that are mobile as opposed to company-
specific, impacting on an organization‟s reliance on internal or external labor markets. 
Arguably, contingent employment practices are more viable in external labor market contexts.  
So, for example, the German economy is well known for its pursuit of a quality based 
production regime that depends on a highly skilled workforce (Culpepper and Finegold, 





development in the job, giving rise to high quality firm and industry specific skills, while 
education at university focuses on occupational skill development. This highly skilled 
workforce is trained and retained in an economically viable way through the unique co-
operative relationship between employers and unions that enable sustainable collective 
bargaining arrangements. Employees are encouraged to invest in their training and stay loyal 
to companies that invest in them through the use of secure employment contracts, strong wage 
levels and employment protection against changes to working conditions exercised via the 
works councils (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Rubery and Grimshaw, 2003). Thus, the high degree 
of employment protection coupled with the specialist skill development system is likely to 
make contingent jobs less attractive from both the employer and employee perspective. 
Sweden shares some commonality with the systems in Germany, but the institutional 
system is less restrictive with reference to organizational adoption of contingent employment 
practice. For instance, in Sweden, like Germany, there is an emphasis on quality based 
production regimes that are more successful with a highly skilled workforce. This is 
supported through vocational colleges that focus on developing firm and industry specific 
skills enabling companies to effectively develop „deep competencies with established 
technologies, and to continuously diversify existing product lines‟ (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001: 
174; Streeck, 1991) and in turn promote internal labor market strategies. Education at 
university level concentrates on occupationally specific skills and job tenure within 
companies is relatively high (Estevez-Abe et al 2001). Employment protection requires notice 
periods for redundancies and information and consultation with the unions on issues affecting 
employment. Much of this employment protection is extended to part-time workers. The 
unions in Sweden are more powerful than those in Germany (Osterman, 1988) and on the 
whole contingent contracts are not viewed as precarious, primarily because of the 





the highly unionized public sector (Mahon, 1996). Equally, organizations in Sweden are given 
greater freedom through the legislation than those in Germany with respect to defining how 
workers are used and in hiring and firing workers. Thus while an initial appraisal of the macro 
institutional systems may appear to have a lot in common with Germany, their interpretation 
in reference to the use of contingent employment contracts suggests that the institutional 
system is more likely to be supportive of contingent employment practices than restrictive. 
Employment protection in the Netherlands is relatively strong, although not to the 
same extent as either Germany or Sweden (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001: 165, table 4.1). The 
dismissal of permanent employees requires regional administrative authorization though this 
can be by-passed through the use of certain contingent employment contracts such as the 
fixed-term contract. The vocational training system is again strong but, unlike Germany and 
Sweden, skills are more industry than company specific, while education at university level is 
much more occupational in nature, making employees more mobile (Estevez-Abe et al 2001). 
Thus the differing employment protection and skill development systems means organizations 
in the Netherlands are arguably more able to adopt a variety of contingent employment 
contracts and to a greater extent when compared to those in Germany or Sweden.  
The UK contrasts with the countries discussed so far in terms of both employment 
protection and skill development. The unions play a weaker role in negotiating the rules 
governing internal labor markets compared to unions in Germany or Sweden. There are few 
legislative restrictions inhibiting employers‟ pursuit of enhanced organizational flexibility. 
However, employment protection for permanent workers extends to contingent workers. In 
terms of the skill formation system, this too varies from those discussed previously. 
Commentators point to the demise of the vocational training system in the UK since the 1970s 
(Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Keep and Mayhew, 1996; Gospel, 1998). Attempt to introduce a 





industry specific skills, further reinforced by efforts to increase generic skills through greater 
numbers of university places. In this context, the contingent employment opportunities in the 
UK are more variable. There has been growth in short-term employment and in part-time 
employment. The growth in self-employment over the last decade reflects the movement of 
some high skilled workers with scare and valuable resources, particularly in the IT industry, 
from permanent jobs to fixed-term contracts were job security is low but the financial rewards 
high (Brewster et al, 1999). Equally, the growth in part-time employment in the UK is 
indicative of the diversity of the labor market where employees are actively seeking 
employment opportunities that enable them to accommodate non-work commitments such as 
carer or parenting responsibilities (Brewster et al., 1999; O‟Reilly and Fagan, 1998). Thus in 
an institutional context that combines limited legislation restricting different types of 
contingent employment practices combined with a relatively strong labor market where 
unemployment is low and employees have transferable skills we might anticipate a moderate 
use of multiple methods of contingent employment contract (e.g. part-time, temporary and 
fixed-term) as opposed to an over or under-reliance on a single method. 
Spain became a democracy in 1977 and since then has undergone rapid change in its 
pursuit for social, political and economic modernization. Employment protection has tended 
to be high in Spain and the unions have a powerful role to play in collective bargaining. 
However, very high levels of unemployment highlighted the rigidities in the system and as a 
result legislative reform aimed at widening the range of contracts that were permitted and 
lowering the termination costs. Therefore, while employment protection for permanent 
workers remains strong, there is greater flexibility in the system, allowing organizations to 
use different forms of contingent employment practices. Attempt to rectify the low 
educational standards pre-1997 have led to a gap, with older people being under-qualified and 





job and occupationally focused and has been strictly controlled by labor ordinances. As a 
result skill development has been characterized as individualized and internalized, largely 
supported via „above the shop‟ private training companies which form an integral part of the 
training system in Spain but are largely under-researched (Martίnez Lucio and Stuart, 2003). 
These conditions might suggest that mobility among permanent workers is low given the 
occupational and internal skill focus, while at the same time the low skilled and marginalized 
segments of the labor market are vulnerable to less stable employment contracts and 
particularly those such as temporary contracts that are more economically favorable to the 
employer.  
In sum, the five European countries selected here reflect different approaches to 
employment protection and skill development, relative to each other, which are embedded 
within unique national institutional structures. At the same time these countries are operating 
within a similar regional economic context, subject to European pressures for convergence, 
and globally competitive pressures for organizational flexibility.  
The analysis of these issues, undertaken in the remainder of the paper, aims to 
contribute to the convergence-divergence debate by considering the nature of the theoretical 
argument and empirical evidence in a European context, enriching the explanation of practice 
and further refining the nature of the antecedents of convergence and divergence in a highly 
regulated and institutionally diverse environment. The 10-year timeframe over which 
organizational practice is compared provides insight into the reality of convergence and 
divergence as opposed to static similarities or differences. 
 
THE CONVERGENCE DEBATE 
The debate between the convergence and divergence strands of management literature 





Briefly, the convergence thesis argues that differences in management systems have arisen as 
a result of the geographical isolation of businesses. The consequent development of differing 
beliefs and the underlying value orientations of national cultures are being, or will be, 
superseded by the logic of technology and markets giving rise to universally applicable 
management techniques (Kidger, 1991). Early post-war thinking was for the most part 
convergent (see for example, Burnham, 1941; Drucker, 1950; Galbraith, 1967; Harbison & 
Myers, 1959). The assumptions were that practice would converge towards the most efficient, 
and therefore, they argued, the US, model. More recently, the convergence thesis has received 
support from transaction cost economics which also contends that at any one point in time 
there exists a best solution to organizing labour (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
Characteristic of these various convergence perspectives is their functionalist mode of 
thought. The practice of management is explained exclusively by reference to its contribution 
to technological and economic efficiency.  It is a dependent variable that evolves in response 
to technological and economic change, rather than with reference to the socio-political 
context, so that “much of what happens to management and labor is the same regardless of 
auspices” (Kerr, 1983).   
There is, however, an alternative perspective. Scott (1987) and Whitley (2000b) both 
comment on the diversity in the range of institutional studies being conducted and the 
importance of recognizing their distinct contributions, irrespective of the label used. One 
distinction that can be drawn is between the US based „new institutionalism‟ perspective and 
the European institutional perspectives. The „new institutionalism‟ research from North 
America (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) focuses on 
explaining how institutions reproduce various templates for organizing: institutionalization “is 
viewed as the social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social 





in shaping economic organization and vice versa. However, since much of the evidence is 
drawn from one country (see the reviews in Scott, 1995; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; and in 
Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002) much of the literature has emphasized “convergent change 
processes” (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002:46). In addition, Whitley (2000b) is critical of 
this perspective for its overemphasis on the cognitive norms at the cost of the regulative and 
normative conventions, while arguing that the three are inextricably bound to each other. 
In contrast the institutional debate in Europe has seen the regulative and normative 
conventions play a much stronger role. However, even within Europe there are a number of 
variants of institutionalism. For example the „societal effects‟ school maintains that the 
uniqueness of each society derives from the interconnectedness of institutional systems such 
as education and training, the industrial relations tradition and social stratification prevents 
economic imperatives creating a convergence in organizational practice (Sorge, 1991). The 
business systems perspective holds that specific nations are locked on a particular 
developmental trajectory reflecting differences in both institutional configuration and 
corresponding social agency; these variations are reflected in the role and structuring of firms. 
Business systems theorists have identified typologies of market economies which provide a 
means of drawing systematic comparisons of the differences and similarities across countries. 
For example, Hall and Soskice (2001) identify two types of market economies, namely 
coordinated market economies (CME) and liberal market economies (LME). Whitley (2000b) 
identifies six ideal types namely, fragmented, coordinated industrial districts, 
compartmentalized, coordinated, state organized and highly organized business systems. 
These typologies are limited to the extent that they do not easily explain the business systems 
within some of the Latin European countries such as Spain. Alternatively, Hollingsworth and 
Boyer (1997) have compared market economies based on the differences between flexible and 





While these perspectives differ in their focus they each highlight the sources of both 
pressures for convergence and divergence. Equally, empirical evidence from the HRM field 
also suggests that different practices may be more or less subject to forces of convergence or 
divergence (Lane, 1989; Rosenzweig and Nohria 1994; Sparrow, Schuler and Jackson, 1994; 
Tregaskis, 1997; Ferner, Quintanilla and Viral, 2001; O‟Sullivan, 2001) and that the dynamic 
nature of these pressures requires analyses that take account of change over time (Slack and 
Hinnings, 1994; Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). Attempts have been made to break out of what 
Smith and Meiksins (1995: 241) called the “stark polarization between convergence and 
divergence” and given rise to more detailed conceptualizations of the factors influencing the 
convergence and divergence process and the outcome for HRM. For example, Smith and 
Meiksins suggest that the interaction of institutional, societal and dominance effects shape 
organizational practice within countries, although the relative impact of these three effects is 
variable over time and between countries. Others argue that institutional factors might lead to 
some form of regional convergence different from the „best practice‟ models found in the 
USA (Lee et al. 2000). Alternatively, authors examining individual values have developed a 
notion of “cross-vergence” which would be something „in between‟ (Ralston et al, 1993) or 
„different from‟ (Ralston et al, 1997) national cultural divergence and institutional 
convergence. Similar attempts have been made at the enterprise level (Giacobbe-Miller et al, 
2003). Combined, this work illustrates the complexity of the convergence-divergence debate 
and the need for a more nuanced discussion of what may not be simple alternatives.  
In short, as well as evidence of similarity across national boundaries, one can find 







HYPOTHESIZING CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN CONTINGENT 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN EUROPE 
Translating these general debates about contingent working practices and convergence 
to the European context enables us to develop a series of hypotheses. To keep this process 
manageable, we have selected the five European countries noted above where the issue of 
contingent employment is politically “live”, as reflected in national debates and recent 
legislation, and where patterns of contingent working appear to be extensive and distinctive 
(cf. Brewster and Tregaskis, 2001). Thus, in this section each form of contingent practice is 
discussed in turn and specific hypotheses derived on the basis of the institutional context 
within each of the five countries.  
 
Part-time Employment 
Part-time employment is often seen as one form of contingent employment that is 
more stable and offers greater security to the employee in comparison with temporary or 
fixed-term contracts. National legislation governing part-time work in Europe varies. Part-
time employment is inter-twined with female participation rates, the nature of labor market 
regulation and extent to which part-time working is voluntary. In the Netherlands atypical 
work, particularly part-time work, was strongly advocated by government as a means of 
combating unemployment (Brewster et al., 1996; Schömann et al., 1998). Since 1990, 
unemployment in the Netherlands has fallen considerably (see table 1) and this has largely 
been explained by the rise in contingent employment contracts, particularly part-time 
employment. The female participation rate is high and the percentage of men taking up part-
time jobs is the highest of the five countries studied (OECD, 2003). Part-time employment in 
the Netherlands is an important mechanism for allowing parents to balance family and work 
commitments and as a result there is a high demand for such types of contracts and the 





part-time work is strongly supported through legislation. Part-timers have a high degree of 
unionization, tend to work more than 20 hours, reflecting their right to reduce their daily 
hours from 8 to 6, in contrast to other countries such as the UK, Spain and Germany where 
the hours worked per week by the majority of part-timers is less than 20 (Eurostat, 1996). The 
proportion of men undertaking part-time work is higher than in Germany, Spain and, until 
1999, the UK (OECD, 2003). In short, there is greater commonality between the Netherlands 
and Sweden when compared to Germany, Spain and the UK with regard to the role of women 
in the labor market, the gendering of work, and the regulatory support surrounding the use of 
part-time contracts.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In contrast, the pattern of women‟s participation in the labor market in Germany and 
the UK share many similarities (Cousins, 1999). Women in both countries tend to take-up 
part-time jobs following the birth of a child. Part-timers are cheaper to employ since those 
working under a certain hours threshold are not entitled to sickness benefits and pensions in 
Germany (Cousins, 1999) and in the UK employers do not pay National Insurance 
contributions (Marullo, 1995). Overall, it could be argued that part-time contracts in the UK 
and Germany are thus more favorable to the employer than the employee compared to those 
in Sweden and the Netherlands, hence restricting demand. Therefore, we would expect 
Germany and the UK to diverge from Sweden and the Netherlands in their use of part-time 
employment.  
Lastly, the incidence of part-time employment in Spain has traditionally been much 
lower than in other European countries. This has largely been due to the high costs associated 
with employing part-timers. Social security benefits paid by employers were around 30% of 
the wages in the early 90s. The Spanish labor market is segmented into four groups; 





exceptionally high (see table 1), and the submerged or informal economy. Given this tradition 
and an institutional context where trade unions are weak, we would expect organizations in 
Spain to use official part-time contracts to a much lower extent than the other countries and 
therefore to diverge in their practice.  
In summary, supportive institutional contexts that promote part-time employment as a 
flexible alternative to full-time employment with mutual benefits for employers and 
employees are more likely to lead to a higher adoption of such contracts compared to those 
institutional contexts where part-time employment is primarily a means of reducing costs for 
employers and an alternative to not working for employees. Specifically, we propose the 
following hypotheses:  
 
H1a: organizations operating in the Netherlands and Sweden will, over time, be 
significantly higher users of part-time contracts than organizations in Germany, the UK and 
Spain. 
H1b: organizations operating in Spain will, over time, be significantly lower users of 
part-time contracts than organizations in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. 
 
Temporary Contracts 
Within Europe temporary and fixed-term contracts are to some degree substitutes for 
each other depending on the legislation surrounding their use. In Germany restrictions are 
placed on the use of temporary employment agencies and employees employed by such 
organizations are issued with a permanent contract (Schömann et al, 1998). Whilst temporary 
workers in Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK are afforded varying degrees of 
employment protections, during the 1990s this was not equal to that afforded permanent 
employees. As a consequence it was cheaper to employ temporary employees and easier to 





remain competitive, particularly in times of economic uncertainty and in certain industry 
sectors such as hospitality and tourism that are vulnerable to seasonal fluctuations, than 
organizations in Germany where the restrictions on temporary contracts limit their 
competitive value. Therefore we would expect the use of temporary contracts in Germany to 
diverge from the use of temporary contracts in other countries. Specifically:  
H2a: organizations operating in Germany will, over time, be significantly lower users 
of temporary contracts than organizations in Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK  
 
However, there are also reasons to expect a divergence between Spain and the other 
countries in its use of temporary contracts. The particularly high unemployment in Spain, the 
industry structure of the country with its significant tourism industry subject to seasonal 
fluctuations and the high costs associated with employing permanent employees together 
make temporary contracts potentially very important for organizational competitiveness and 
sustainability (Marshall, 1989). The legislative context in Spain also leads us to suspect 
differences with the other countries. We would expect differences between the UK and Spain 
since traditionally protection for permanent workers in Spain has been very stronger than in 
the UK (Siebert, 1997). Reforms enabling the use of temporary contracts have meant a 
significant expansion in the use of these contracts as a means of replacing permanent 
contracts (Argandoña, 1997). Using Grubb and Wells‟ (1993) index of dismissal protection, 
Siebert (1997: 236) argues that „dismissal protection institutionalizes the very thing – 
temporary jobs – which it is designed to prevent‟. Given the institutional context we would 
expect temporary contract use by organizations in Spain to diverge from that of organizations 
in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. Specifically,   
H2b: organizations operating in Spain will, over time, be significantly higher users of 







Across Europe, during the 90s, national legislation existed in all countries other than 
the UK and Ireland regarding the use of fixed-term contracts. However, national laws varied 
dramatically, making fixed-term contracts potentially more attractive in some countries than 
others.  
Fixed-term contracts play an important role for organizations in Spain and were 
dominated by women, young people and nearly all new entrants to the job market (Eurostat, 
1996). Evidence suggests fixed-term contracts are particularly prevalent in small firms and in 
large organizations including multinationals, public sector work that is contracted out and in 
retailing firms (Reico, 1992). Fixed-term contracts have been strongly backed by government 
with supporting labor legislation to make them highly cost effective. As such we would 
expect fixed-term contracts to be used extensively by organizations in Spain.  
In Germany, fixed-term contracts substitute for temporary contracts. Fixed-term 
contracts in Germany have been used primarily for women returners and those beginning their 
careers, with 70% of men and 74% of women in those categories employed on such contracts 
in 1995 (European Commission, 1996). The range of circumstances for which fixed-term 
contracts can be used was relaxed through the employment protection Act of 1985 and fixed-
term contracts were seen as a positive way of tackling unemployment (Schömann et al, 1998).  
In the Netherlands, restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts are minimal, 
primarily relating to renewal. Jacobs (1992) argued that the widespread use of fixed-term 
contracts is largely linked to the requirement by law for employers to seek permission, at 
governmental level, for the dismissal of any employee who has not agreed to the termination 
of their contract. Fixed-term contracts overcome these restrictions, providing organizations in 
the Netherlands with a strong incentive for using such contracts.  





Nevertheless, these jobs remain highly unionized and have a moderate degree of employment 
protection (Mahon, 1996). In the UK there are few statutory restrictions limiting the use of 
fixed-term contracts, but these contracts are also covered by employment rights relating to 
permanent contracts, with some alterations relating to waiving the right to unfair dismissal 
protection (Schömann et al, 1998). So, this is not necessarily an inexpensive option for the 
employer (Casey, 1991). Hence, in both Sweden and the UK we might expect fixed-term 
contracts to be used less extensively, compared with organizations in Spain, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Specifically, 
 
H3a: organizations operating in Germany, Spain and the Netherlands will, over time, 
be significantly higher users of fixed-term contracts than organizations in the UK and Sweden 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Unlike much of the previous work in this field our analysis focuses on organizational 
practice as opposed to employee data as a means of understanding patterns in the level of 
contingent employment in Europe. Evidence is drawn from survey data collected by the 
Cranfield Network on European Human Resource Management (Cranet-E), starting in 1989 
with five countries; and increasing in each round of collection (1991; 1995; 1999/2000) since 
then. The survey instrument was developed jointly by the international research network, was 
drafted in the English language and then, through the established back-translation process 
(Brislin, 1976), translated into the language or languages appropriate to each participating 
country. These questionnaires were distributed to senior HR specialists in organizations with 
200 or more employees and a pilot study undertaken. The use of single respondents in survey 
research has limitations in terms of the researcher‟s inability to assess the reliability of the 





numerical answers are required)
i
. Due to local sensitivities regarding company anonymity it 
was not possible to track the same companies over time, however the same databases were 
drawn on during each round of data collection. Comparisons against Eurostat employment 
figures suggest that, across Europe, the sample over-represented the manufacturing sector and 
large firms. The first and last 10% of the questionnaires received were checked for significant 
differences and none were found. Data collection procedures and sample distributions for 
1991 are discussed in detail in Brewster and Hegewisch (1994), for 1995 in Brewster et al., 
(1996) and for 1999/2000 in Tregaskis et al., (2004).  
 
Sample 
Countries: Within Germany, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK the sample 
included a total of 2918 organizations in 1991, 2048 in 1995 and 1555 in 1999/2000. For the 
distribution of organizations by country see Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Measures of Contingent Employment Practice 
The analysis examines three forms of contingent working, namely, part-time, 
temporary and fixed-term contracts. Each was measured through a single question which 
asked “What proportion of the workforce is employed on the following contracts”. Responses 
were recorded as follows: 1=less than 1%, 2=1 to 10%, 3=11-20%, 4=greater than 20%. 
 
Analysis  
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to test for the effect of 
country on the use of contingent employment practices by organizations at each time point.  





organization was measured in terms of the numbers of employees (1=200 to 499, 2=500-999, 
3=1000 or more). Second, we identified the industry sector (1=manufacturing, 2=services, 
3=public sector) of the organization. Third, the ownership of the organizations was measured 
(1=home owned, 2=foreign owned, 3=indigenous organization). This categorization 
recognized the difference between multinational companies on the basis of whether they were 
home owned or foreign owned. It also included an indigenous category which captured home 
owned companies that were not multinationals i.e. that were not part of a larger organization 
with operations in other countries. The indigenous category included the public sector 
organizations but also service and manufacturing companies that were not multinationals. 
Fourth, we measured the level of trade union membership as a percentage of the workforce 
(1=0%, 2=1 to 25%, 3=26 to 50%, 4=51 to 75%, 5=76-100%). Europe has the highest 
proportion of members of independent trade unions in the world, with many countries having 
more than a third of their workforce in trade unions. Nevertheless, trade union membership 
varies considerable across the five countries as a result of legislation and norms, with 
membership in the UK being the lowest, more moderate in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Spain whilst state provision in Sweden makes it nearly universal (EIRO, 2000; Rigby, Smith 
and Brewster, 2004). Given the significance of trade union membership in Europe and the 
variation across countries its inclusion as a control factor enables us to account for any 
influence this may have on the use of flexibility. The MANOVA was constrained for main 
effects only. For the distribution of organizations by year across the control variables, see 
Table 2. To test the specific hypotheses planned comparisons were applied using the 
SPECIAL contrasts command in SPSS.  
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 3. Overall, the use of 





exception of fixed-term contracts which show a slight decrease. However, the standard 
deviation suggests there is a high degree of variability in the use of these contracts across the 
five countries.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Country was found to have a significant effect on contingent employment practice in 
all three years accounting for between 21% and 11% of the variance (1991 - Wilks‟ =.49, 
approx. F=174.85, df=12/6752, p< .001, Eta
2
=.21; 1995 - Wilks‟ =.63, approx. F=82.37, 
df=12/5096, p< .001, Eta
2
 =.15; 1999 - Wilks‟ =.70, approx. F=48.55, df=12/3968, p < .001, 
Eta
2
 =0.11). Each of the four control variables were found to have a significant impact on the 
use of contingent employment practice, as expected, although the size of this impact was 
marginal in comparison with country effects: sector had the strongest impact accounting for 
between 6-8% of the variance, size, trade union membership and ownership only accounted 
for 1% of the variance. Table 4 details the multivariate statistics in full for the control 
variables.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 5 shows the univariate effects of country, controlling for size, sector, ownership 
and trade union membership and the means for each form of contingent employment practice. 
Planned contrasts were used to test the relationships specified in each hypothesis and these are 
discussed in detail below. The family wise alpha was set at .05, meaning the nominal alpha 






TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Hypothesis 1a stated that organizations in the Netherlands and Sweden would be 
higher users of part-time contracts than those in Germany, the UK or Spain and that this 
significant divergence would remain over time. The planned comparisons confirm this 
hypothesis (1991: t=14.511, p< .001; 1995: t=13.20, p< .001, 1999: t=13.37, p< .001). 
Hypothesis 1b argued that organizations in Spain would be the lowest user of part-time 
contracts during the 1990s. Again this was confirmed by the planned comparisons (1991: 
t=23.131, p< .001, 1995: t=22.10, p< .001, 1999: t=15.96, p< .001). Therefore the results 
show no convergence over time, rather Sweden and the Netherlands remain the greatest users 
of part-time contracts, the middle ground is held by organizations in the UK and Germany 
while those in Spain continue to diverge, remaining the lowest user of part-time contracts 
during the 1990s. Examination of the mean scores for the use of part-time contracts by 
organizations in each country show that the UK, Germany and the Netherlands reflect an 
upward trend in the use of part-time contracts over time. This could be argued as indicative of 
organizational responses to regional convergence pressures from the European Union and 
regional competitive demands for greater organizational flexibility. The organizational pattern 
of part-time contract use in both Sweden and Spain is more erratic, with organizations in 
Sweden decreasing their use of part-time contracts over time, whilst still remaining one of the 
highest users. In contrast, organizations in Spain have increased overall their use of part-time 
contracts but show a marked fall in the use of part-time contracts in the mid 1990s. This is 
likely to reflect organizations‟ responses to the difficulties of the economic recession at this 
time, reinforced by the peak in the use of both temporary and fixed-term contracts at the same 
time. Therefore, the analysis relating to the first set of hypotheses suggests that the use of 





an upward shift in the use of part-time contracts, the differences that existed between the 
organizations in the countries in 1991 remain a decade later.  
The second set of hypotheses focused on the use of temporary contracts. It was argued 
in hypothesis 2a that Germany would be the lowest user of temporary contracts over the 
decade studied. The results confirmed this continuing difference between organizational 
practice in Germany and that in the other countries (1991: t=21.47, p< .001, 1995: t=18.25, p< 
.001, 1999: t=12.84, p< .001). Hypothesis 2b stated that Spain too would diverge from the 
other countries by being consistently the highest user of temporary contracts. However, the 
planned comparisons showed mixed support for this relationship (1991: t=2.13, ns, 1995: 
t=9.22, p<.001, 1999: t=1.50, ns). Specifically, only in 1995 did the use of temporary 
contracts by organizations in Spain peak to levels that were significantly higher than those in 
the Netherlands, Sweden and UK.  This finding suggests that the legislative changes in Spain 
aimed at enhancing labor flexibility may have enabled organizations in Spain to gain the 
flexibility afforded other countries, but not necessarily to exceed this, at least with respect to 
the use of temporary contracts. It is also important to remember in this context that the data 
here includes only those organizations employing 200 or more employees. The pattern of 
contingent employment use, and temporary contracts in particular, may be very different 
among smaller organizations.  
The third hypothesis stated that organizations in Germany, Spain and the Netherlands 
would be significantly higher users of fixed-term contracts than those in the UK and Sweden 
during the decade examined. Again, the results from the planned comparisons confirmed this 
hypothesis (1991: t=34.35, p< .001, 1995: t=15.21, p< .001, 1999: t=17.27, p< .001). The 
mean scores show that while organizations in the Netherlands have remained one of the 
highest users of fixed-term contracts during the 1990s they have dramatically reduced their 





some limited evidence of convergence. The decline in the use of fixed-term contracts coupled 
with the sharp rise in the use of part-time contracts appears to reflect a shift in the mode by 
which organizations are attempting to achieve greater flexibility.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to establish if organizations operating in Europe were, 
over a specified time period, converging in their adoption of contingent employment practice. 
The results suggest that this is not the case and that the pattern of organizational practice is 
more complex. Overall, organizations across the five countries have tended to increase their 
use of contingent employment contracts from 1991 to 2000. This finding could be seen as 
indicative of regional isomorphic pressures for convergence, which have given rise to 
“directional” convergence. However, the data also show that the divergence between the 
countries in evidence during the early 1990s remains a decade later. There is no evidence that 
either the regional institutional pressures coming from the European Commission or regional 
or global competitive pressures are creating “final” convergence in organizational practice. 
We would argue that these findings support the divergence (or at least the non-convergence or 
stasis) thesis that the role of national institutional systems is a powerful force for shaping 
local organizational responses with respect to the use of contingent employment contracts 
(Whitley, 2000b; Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
In the case of part-time working, the institutional protection afforded in the 
Netherlands encouraged a divergence in practice from the other countries. At the same time 
the lack of institutional protection and the power of employers to regulate demand leads 
practice in Spain to diverge in the opposite direction. Therefore, part-time employment does 
not afford organizations across Europe the same degree of organizational adaptability and 





sector policy provides a reinforcing complementarity (Pierson, 2000) or a supporting 
incentive encouraging firm reliance on the distinct comparative advantage offered by the 
institutional context (Wood, 2001).  
Temporary and fixed-term contracts are underpinned by different legal and industrial 
relations frameworks across Europe. The findings here indicate clear consequences of these 
divergent frameworks. During the 1990s, temporary contracts were not highly regulated 
except in Germany where there was a lower use of these contracts. The more liberal 
legislation in the other countries has enabled a greater degree of commonality in 
organizational practice in terms of the adoption of temporary contracts. Equally, fixed-term 
contracts in the UK and Sweden are less favorable to the employer and as a result are used 
less by organizations in those countries.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that the divergence in micro-economic conditions, 
industrial relations traditions and government policy has led organizations to adopt contingent 
employment practices that are in line with local as opposed to regional or global isomorphic 
pressures. As a result organizational practice with regard to the use of contingent workers has 
remained distinct during the decade of the 1990s. It remains to be seen whether over the next 
10 years, with the introduction of the new European directives on part-time, temporary and 
fixed-term working which gives these workers greater protection and more common terms of 
reference throughout Europe, this divergence continues.  
The findings raise a number of wider implications regarding the convergence-
divergence debates. First, for multinationals the data suggest that in some country contexts the 
institutional complementarities (Hall and Soskice, 2001) may require adaptation of practices, 
since attempts to circumvent influence, while possible, may not make competitive sense. This 
would be consistent with institutional arguments of local isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio 





may be more likely in some contexts than others (Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal, 1999; 
Tregaskis et al., 2001; Ferner, Quintanilla and Varul, 2001). The multivariate analysis 
undertaken in the paper controlled for the effects of the MNC, at the same time the results 
illustrated that there were little differences between MNCs and non-MNCs (i.e. indigenous 
companies) in their use of contingent employment practices. While the study was not 
designed specifically to examine the extent to which MNCs resist or adopt local practice, the 
limited evidence suggests that in the countries studied there was a greater tendency for 
multinationals to conform to the local norm with regard to its use of contingent workers.  
Second, the collection of comparable data at three points in time has enabled the issue 
of convergence and divergence to be examined from a dynamic as opposed to static 
perspective. By so doing the analysis has illustrated the fluctuations in national practice over 
time. Whilst there is evidence of directional convergence here, in that there has been some 
overall increase in the use of contingent working, there is little or no sign of final 
convergence. As a summary we might say that the national recipes remain strong and 
distinctive. The fact that elements of both forms can be identified emphasizes the need for a 
carefully nuanced approach to questions of isomorphism. Our findings here provide 
representative data to support theoretical (Smith and Meiksins, 1995) and case study evidence 
(Ferner, Quintanilla and Varul, 2001) which indicated the complexity of these issues, the 
national embeddedness of HRM practices and the dynamic nature of evolving national 
business systems. 
Third, the inevitable limitations of the comparative survey method raise 
methodological implications for future work. It is critical to capture the dynamic nature of the 
convergence and divergence process in addition to the nested characteristics of the 
organizational relationships that tap into the complex and subtle evolution of institutional 





Longitudinal and historical case work in combination with the longitudinal survey method 
could help unravel how the social groups and actors within the institutional field influence 
organizational practice and how organizations may, in some instances, circumvent attempts to 
influence (Oliver, 1991). The recognition that the institutions themselves change over time 
(Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002) reinforces the need for a dynamic approach to analysis. 
Also, the process of deinstitutionalization (“the process by which institutions weaken and 
disappear” Scott, 2001: 182) and its impact within a European context could be particularly 
fruitful in unraveling the effect of the European Union at the national level (see also Oliver, 
1992; Townley, 2002; Zilber, 2002). Research by Townley (2002) and Zilber (2002) 
illustrated how political and social drivers of deinstitutionalization can lead to the demise of 
existing organizational norms and practices making way for organizational innovation. In the 
context of contingent employment in Europe this raises questions about what effect the 
European Union‟s recent directives on contingent employment will have on 
deinstitutionalizing national level norms on contingent employment. Further, the rise in the 
numbers of contingent employees introduces a greater degree of heterogeneity into the 
workforce, potentially giving rise to greater diversity in cognitive frameworks (Zilber, 2002) 
relating to the employment relationship. This heterogeneity may “diminish consensus and 
unquestioning adherence to taken-for-granted practices” and facilitate the uptake of 
contingent employment practices within a revised or adapted framework of supportive 
institutional structures.  
Fourth, many questions remain regarding which organizational practices are more 
susceptible to convergence and divergence pressures and in which areas of HRM 
multinationals are more likely to resist local isomorphic pressures to diverge from parent 
practice (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Taylor, 2004). Kostova and Roth (2002) found 





institutional context. We need to further refine our conceptualization of convergence by 
considering the interplay between the various elements (normative, regulative and cognitive) 
of the institutional context particularly when organizations are faced with pressures from 
multiple institutional contexts, as in the case of Europe presented here.  
Fifth, at the organizational level the study raises practical implications for managers in 
terms of using contingent employment as a tool for organizational flexibility. The differing 
institutional contexts that capture not only legislation, but industrial relations traditions and 
norms, mean that specific forms of contingency work are perceived more or less favorably. 
Their widespread use is dependent upon the societal legitimacy of such employment 
relationships, facilitated by, for example, supporting social security systems, trade union 
support and employment protection (Koene, Paauwe and Groenewegen, 2004). 
In conclusion, this study has presented unique data over a 10-year timeframe on 
organizational convergence and divergence in contingent employment practice in Europe. The 
evidence suggests organizational practice remains distinct across Europe despite European 
and global isomorphic pressures. However, the complexities and evolution of the interaction 
between institutional stakeholders and organizational actors is under-researched. More 
specific longitudinal investigations and meta-analyses allowing a dynamic examination of the 
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TABLES FOR TEXT 
 
 
TABLE 1: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
 1990 1995 2000 
Germany 6.2 7.9 7.5 
The Netherlands 6.0 7.1 2.6 
Spain 15.7 22.7 14.1 
Sweden 1.7 7.7 4.7 
UK 5.9 8.5 5.5 
European Union 7.8 10.5 8.1 
Total OECD 5.8 7.4 6.2 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 














Temporary 1.50 .87 .168 -  











Temporary 1.68 .95 .106 -  











Temporary 1.72 .98 .264 -  
Fixed-term 1.44 1.02 .155 .129 - 
 N = 2918/2048/1555. Correlation coefficients greater than .19 are significant at p< .05; those 





TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF MANOVA OUTPUT FOR CONTROL VARIABLES 
 





















































































 TABLE 5 
SUMMARISED UNIVARIATE EFFECTS FROM MANOVA 
 
  Country Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable F Eta
2

































































































1991 df=4/2552; 1995 df=4/1928; 1999/2000 df=4/1502 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
 
 
                                                 
i
 In Switzerland in 1991, the survey was sent to both the HR director and the CEO (Hilb, 1991) and revealed no 
significant differences between the two respondents. 
